preserve intact the richness and, as far as that is possible, the literal meaning of divine revelation as found in Holy Scripture and tradition. If, at any time, because of an apparent impossibility of reconciling the words of revelation with "firmly established theological principles/ ' it seems that these words are to be interpreted in a non-literal sense, then surely the theologian should examine whether such an irreconcilability be real or only apparent, and, secondly, he should seriously consider whether the conclusions he draws from such theological principles be indeed genuinely legitimate.
As Galtier well remarks, 3 if a philosophic principle, arrived at by the natural light of reason, does not square with supernatural revelation, or does so only with difficulty, then it surely is not to be expected that divine revelation should be bent and twisted to fit within the cadre of a particular philosophic system. If any change or compromise is to be made, it must be on the side of philosophy; the system of philosophy must be adapted to revelation, or at least it must be acknowledged that a philosophy based on purely natural experience and reasoning does not contain all reality within its domain. For the supernatural is most real; and, surely, it is quite beyond the reach of mere philosophy.
The explanation of the non-exclusively proprium theory of the inhabitation, as presented in the following pages, is not to be considered as more than a tentative solution. Nevertheless, this writer believes that such a theory better safeguards the absolute inseparability of created and uncreated grace, and, at the same time, guarantees the strictly transcendental character of the supernatural in created grace. If, according to this explanation, a solution to the ordinary objections against this theory is suggested, then, it is hoped, some theologians may be tempted to reconsider the personal role of the divine Persons in our sanctification.
ARGUMENTS FOR PURE APPROPRIATION
Every theologian must admit that both Scripture and the Fathers use language that seemingly, at least, ascribes a special personal role to the Holy Spirit in our sanctification. With regard to St. Cyril of Alexandria, in particular, J. Mahé maintains that, if one takes Cyril seriously, one cannot but admit that he attributes a special role to the Holy Spirit. 4 Theologians generally, however, interpret this special emphasis on the Holy Spirit according to pure appropriation. 5 Unlike Mahé and A. Eröss, 6 these theologians fail to recognize that, between pure appropriation and the exclusively proprium theory of Petavius, there is a possible middle course in the non-exclusively proprium theory. It is to the credit of Scheeben that he drew the attention of theologians to this possible middle course.
Advocates of the more common appropriation theory maintain that the manner of presence and union is identically and under every respect the same for all three divine Persons. This is a necessary consequence, so these theologians believe, of the fact that the influence of each Person in sanctification is in every way the same as that of the other two Persons. When, therefore, the work of sanctification is attributed to the Holy Spirit, this is only by pure appropriation. Since the effecting of sanctification-a work of love-has greater resemblance to the hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit than to that of Father and Son, it is quite proper to appropriate sanctification to the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, so we are told by these theologians, the role of the Holy Spirit in our sanctification is under every respect identical with the part played by the Father and the Son.
The main reasons offered in support of appropriation are the following. Arguing from the words of the Council of Florence: "omniaque [in divinis] sunt unum, ubi non obviât relationis oppositio," theologians rightly conclude that "omnia opera ad extra sunt communia to ti Trinitati." This principle is unquestionable; in fact, its definition was prepared at Vatican. 7 From this corollary of Florence the proponents of appropriation deduce the following argument. Since, they say, sanctification and the inhabitation are clearly an opus ad extra, they are in every respect quite common to all three divine Persons. 4 "La sanctification d'après saint Cyrille d 'Alexandrie," Rev. d'hist. ecclês., Χ (1909) , 477.
5 Cf. Galtier, op. cit., passim. 6 Mahé, loe. cit.; Eröss, " Die persönliche Verbindung mit der Dreifaltigkeit," Scholastik, XI (1936) , 392 f. 7 Cf. Collectio Lacensis, VII, S. 514b., 540a., et alibi; for instance, we read: "Si quis creationem aut quamvis aliam operationem ad extra uni personae divinae ita propriam esse dixerit, ut non sit omnibus communis, una et indivisa; anathema sit" (ibid., 1636d., can. 4).
Hence, there is not the faintest nuance of difference in the manner of the indwelling or union of the divine Persons. Every kind of personal union is flatly rejected. Although it is admitted that the Persons are indeed present according to their mutual distinctions and hypostatic characters, the theologians generally deny that this demands any difference in the mode of presence for each Person. Hypostatic character and mode of presence are two distinct things, not to be confused. Plurality of the one does not demand plurality of the other. In support of the above argument, Galtier, among others, proposes the following. Since, he tells us, the divine relations as such get all their reality and perfection from the one common divine essence and since the divine Persons as such are distinguished from one another by these same divine relations, consequently, the divine Persons have all their reality from the one and common divine essence. Because of the poverty of the divine Persons ("la pauvreté de leur être particulier"), no one Person, as such, can confer upon the soul any reality which is not equally, and in identically the same way, communicated to the soul by the other two Persons. And, since the new presence follows upon the new effect and since this effect is in every way identically the same for, and common to, all three divine Persons, the mode of presence will also be one and common in every way to all three Persons.
9
Finally, many theologians claim that St. Thomas holds pure appropriation in his teaching on the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. Without investigating further the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, it is nonetheless interesting to note that the passages cited by B. Froget, for instance, deal only with efficient causality. And the same holds true for the conciliar arguments proposed by the same theologian.
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Such argumentation is, unfortunately for its proponent, quite beside the point. For, as all will admit, if there be only question of efficient causality in sanctification, there could be no possibility of any kind of proprium theory whatsoever. However, according to P. Galtier, 11 that opinion is today becoming more common which holds that un- created grace exercises some kind of formal causality in our sanctification.
Nevertheless, the problem is not precisely whether or not uncreated grace really exercises quasi-formal causality in sanctification. Rather, the question with which we are concerned is whether the saying, "omnia opera ad extra sunt communia toti Trinitati," is true even when there is involved, not efficient, but quasi-formal causality on the part of the indwelling divine Persons. In other words, does this dictum demand that, even in the case of such quasi-formal causality, the influence and mode of presence of each divine Person be identically the same as that of the other Persons?
Unless this mode of presence, or (as we prefer) this passive presence of the Persons in the soul, is in some way different for each divine Person, then all possibility of any kind of proprium union and indwelling at once disappears.
With regard to the objection based on the so-called pauvreté of the divine Persons, it is sufficient for our purpose merely to indicate that one may envisage the divine Persons in two different ways. One can consider them reduplicative, namely, according to their precise relative aspect, that is, according to the formal ratio of their distinction, the proprietas distinguens. Or, on the other hand, one may regard the divine Persons as taken specificative, that is as a subsistens divinum distinctum. If only the elementum distinguens is taken into consideration and not also the subsistens distinctum-that is, if the relations (and divine Persons) are envisaged only in abstracto and not also in concreto as they actually exist-then, of course, one may speak of the "pauvreté de leur être particulier. ,, But, as R. P. Juan B. Manya has pointed out in a masterful essay, 12 such a procedure would 12 "Metafísica de la relación 'In Divinis,' " Revista española de teología, V (1945) , 277 f. He writes thus: "El esse ad, pues, si pudiese ser obtenido perfectamente aislado, no expresaría perfección alguna en ningún sujeto, ni en su principio ni en su término, porque prescindiría de todo sujeto, de todo principio y de todo término. En realidad sería un absurdo y, por tanto, la nada." And, again, "Y nótese que cuando no se trata de la relación en abstracto, sino de la relatio in divinis, esse algo indispensable en el concepto de relación se presenta concreto y determinado: Dios, la divina substancia. Por tanto, el puro esse aa in divinis, el concepto formal de la divina relación que prescindiera adecuadamente de la essencia divina, expresaría un absurdo, expresaría la nada, no expresaría perfección alguna" (loe. cit.). be a vivisection of the divine Persons. In fact, if one consider merely the esse ad in a divine relation, or, for that matter, in any relation, one would be guilty of indulgence in metaphysical illusions, in pure imagining. For an esse ad, or a pure saltus, considered as adequately distinct from the thing related, is a pure nothingness and utterly inconceivable.
THE NON-EXCLUSIVELY PROPRIUM THEORY
We do not intend to prove that this theory is true. As already indicated, even the proponents of pure appropriation readily admit that Scripture and the Fathers speak of a personal indwelling of the divine Persons in the just soul, and this with special emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit. 13 Galtier, however, holds that no form of the proprium theory can be reconciled with solidly established theological principles ("avec les conclusions les plus avérées de la thé-ologie trinitaire")·
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On the other hand, there are not a few theologians who maintain that an explanation of the inhabitation according to pure appropriation would logically lead to a denial of a radical difference between the ordinary substantial presence of God in all creatures and the special inhabitation of God in the just soul. In the natural order, creatures by remote analogy participate in the perfections of the God of creation and conservation; as a result, they are related to Deus unus. Contrariwise, in the supernatural order, the grace-filled soul shares in the inner trinitarian life of God; consequently, such a soul is related to Deus trinus. And, since all the newness of this presence and relation is on the side of the creature alone, it is indeed difficult to see how such an utterly new kind of presence and relation can exist without some kind of difference being postulated in the mode of presence by which each divine Person is present to and in the just soul.
J. Beumer maintains that, although in the popular literature on the subject much is said that is indeed very inspiring and beautiful concerning this immediate presence of the divine Persons, on the other hand, the technical terminology of the theologians greatly weakens all this through the insistence on an explanation according to pure appropriation. 15 Since most of those theologians who reject the proprium theory in all its forms do so on metaphysical grounds, we shall propose a tentative metaphysical explanation of the non-exclusively proprium theory of the inhabitation. This explanation, so we believe, does not violate any solidly established principles of trinitarian metaphysics. And, nevertheless, this explanation will require some kind of difference in the manner of presence according to which each distinct divine Person is present to, and united with, the just soul.
16
Furthermore, such a solution will demand three distinct relations to the Blessed Trinity, a relation to, and union with, each divine Person.
SOLUTION THROUGH THE PRINCIPLES OF DE LA TAILLE
St. Peter tells us that through grace we are made true sharers of the divine nature itself (2 Pet. 1:4). And the fact of the indwelling of the three divine Persons in the soul is clearly stated in Scripture and tradition. From grace and the inhabitation of the divine Persons there arises a most intimate union between God and the just soul.
17
Any metaphysical solution of the inhabitation and the grace-state must, therefore, show, if possible, how the three divine Persons communicate in a finite and participated manner their nature to the just soul, and this through created grace. At the same time, such a solution must also explain the union resultant upon the presence of the indwelling Persons. 18 15 "Die Einwohnung der drei göttlichen Personen in der Seele des begnadeten Menschen," Theologie und Glaube, XXX (1938) , 504; cf., P. Gächter, "Unsere Einheit mit Christus nach dem hl. Irenaeus," ZKT, LVIII (1934) , 527 ff. 16 Let it be clear from the beginning that the "difference" in the manner of presence for each divine Person will be, according to the theory which we shall suggest, not an absolute difference, but one that is strictly relative. 17 It is interesting to note that H. du Manoir de Juaye maintains that there is no distinction allowable between the operation of the divine Persons and their union with the just soul {Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie [Paris, 1944], 241). This attitude is explainable, perhaps, by the author's acknowledged indebtedness to Galtier (ibid., p. 237, n. 2) .
18 With regard to the relationship between, and the relative priority of, created and uncreated grace, the following essays will be found enlightening: J. Martinez Gómez, "Relación entre la inhabitación del Espíritu Santo y los dones creados de la justificación,"
The various theories concerning all this are well known: the "sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante," as one aspect of St. 24 But in all these various explanations we find the same difficulties: how can a created, physical accident make us truly sharers of the divine nature, and how can uncreated grace, which surely does not inform the soul, truly sanctify? Or, again, how can one say that the three divine Persons dwell within the soul without there being the slightest difference in the manner of their presence?
These are some of the difficulties that confront one who would seek a solution of the inhabitation. And-let us at once admit it-the solution of these difficulties is far from easy.
Nevertheless, in the words of the Vatican Council and of Pope Pius XII, we may perhaps, by comparing this marvel of the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity with that other august mystery of our faith, the Incarnation of the Son of God, discover new light that may aid in arriving at a solution of the problem. 25 For, in the Incarnation, we have the most perfect union between a creature and God. In one Person we have one being who is both God and Man. Two perfect and complete natures in the Person of the Word; there are not two subjects or Persons, not one who is God and another who is man; there is just one Person who is Man while remaining true God. There is in Jesus Christ the highest possible communication of the divinity to a creature; yet the human nature truly retains its creaturely quality. Hence, the human nature in the God-man, Jesus Christ, is a perfect human nature; yet it is not the human nature of a mere man. It is God's humanity; united in substantial union with the Word of God, it exists by sharing in His very own being. The humanity of Christ is impregnated, filled to the full with the very being of God, precisely as this being is proper to the Word.
For De la Taille, this union between the humanity and the Person of the Word is effected by the actuation of the obediential potency in the human nature.
26 This is not a case of actuation through information, but of actuation by an act, a divine act, which actuates, but does not inform. In order to elevate the humanity to a level where it bears some proportion for union with the Word, a change of some kind must take place in the humanity; for, according to St. Thomas, 27 nothing can receive a higher form, unless it be raised to this capacity by some disposition. When two terms unite, change must take place in one or other of these terms. In the hypostatic union this elevation of the subjective obediential potency to the level for union with the Word is called by De la Taille created actuation by uncreated act.
This will not be a disposition that is antecedent to the union; rather, will it be the grace of union in all its reality, newness, considered in its very foundation. In the language of De la Taille, this will be an amélioration, disposition infuse, perfectionnement, adaptation, etc., by which the humanity, through the actuation of the obediential potency, is raised to the necessary level of the hypostatic union. At the same time, it is the union taken passively; for it is but the reception of the actuation into the potency: it is union with the act which actuates, but does not inform.
And it must be noted that this created actuation is not a mode of union, a sort of trait d'union, which the humanity would touch on one side and the Person of the Word on the other. This is in accord with the saying of St. Thomas: ". . . sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo non fit mediante aliquo habitu."
28 And in another place St. Thomas stresses the immediacy of the union between the humanity and the Person of the Word:
.... in unione hunianae naturae ad divinam nihil potest cadere medium formaliter unionem causans, cui per prius humana natura conjungatur quam divinae personae: sicut enim inter materiam et formam nihil cadit medium in esse quod per prius sit in materia quam forma subs tan tialis; alias esse accidentale esset prius substantial!, quod est impossibile; ita inter naturam et suppositum non potest aliquid dicto modo medium cadere, cum utraque conjunctio sit ad esse substantiate (italics inserted).
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The intermediary to be rejected, as De la Taille insists on many occasions, is any kind of mode which would in any way affect the humanity antecedently to the union with the Person of the Word. This does not mean that a modification is not admitted which would be consequent upon, or better concomitant with, the very union itself. Such a modification of the humanity would, in reality, be nothing else than the hypostatic union itself taken qua union in the passive sense. For the modification of the humanity, considered as a formal substantial perfecting of this humanity, is that by which the human nature is elevated to the proper level for union with the Word; as an actuation of the humanity, this modification is introduced into it by the Word and refers the human nature to the Word with whom it is united in substantial union. Now we come to the precise point which is indeed fundamental to the solution which we are suggesting. For De la Taille, that which in the last analysis endows a divine gift with a strictly supernatural quality is not the causal relation (efficient causality) to God. Rather it is, in a manner that is either immediate or remote, a relation of union between created passive potency-nature or faculty-and the uncreated act.
This passive potency will not be an ordinary subjective potency, one connatural to the creature; rather, will it be, in the strictest sense of the word, obediential, consisting in the non-repugnance of the assumption of a human nature to personal union with a divine Person. But in order that the humanity may be rendered apt for such a union, a divinely infused disposition is necessary. In the hypostatic union this will be of the substantial order, while in the beatific vision and in justifying grace the infused disposition will be in the accidental order.
Such a disposition must not, as we have already indicated, be thought to exist in the humanity prior to union with the Word. No, this modification of the human nature is introduced therein by the Word and is indissolubly dependent upon the divine act for its very existence. Consequently, in that the infused disposition is in very truth the union itself (taken passively) with the Word and again, since such a union is in the strictest sense wholly supernatural, it is clear that the infused disposition is entirely and absolutely supernatural. Most truly, then, is it called the grace of union, a grace that is indeed supernatural in the highest possible degree.
The theological reasoning that led De la Taille to his thesis on the supernatural seems to be partly, at least, the following. If one holds that the supernatural is absolutely transcendent to creatures, whether they be human or angelic, then it seems that only a presence of God by union or by quasi-formal causality will fulfil the requirement of the absolutely supernatural. Were God to be present only through an effect of efficient causality, it would be very difficult to show that such a presence is radically different from His natural presence in creatures. If His presence is due only to an effect of His efficiency, then such a presence would not go beyond the relation of creature to Creator, of effect to cause. On the other hand, through a presence effected by the union of the uncreated divine Act with a created potency, there springs up a relation of the creature to God that is completely novae speciei, different from every natural relation of men and angels to God. For in such a case there will be true participation by the creature in the inner life of the Godhead. Of course, efficiency is necessary, but the ratio of the efficient cause does not as such enter formally into such a union qm union.
In the hypostatic union, for example, this created actuation, in so far as it results from divine efficiency, has a relation to the entire Trinity, as to unum principium indistinctum of the actuation's very existence. 30 Yet, since this created actuation is also the reception of the actuation into the potency, and is therefore union with the act which is not received but nevertheless actuates, this created actuation has a relation to the Person of the Word; and under the ratio of a formal communication of divine being as proper to the Word, the actuation produces in the humanity a relationship terminating at the Word alone.
The relation of the humanity to the Second Person involves a mutation on the human side of the union, because all the newness of the union comes from the created element. Now, as St. Thomas teaches, 31 every mutation consists of actio and passio. Since in the hypostatic union only the human'element of the union can change, the whole reality of the mutation will consist in the passio. This will be the foundation of the relation of the human nature to the Word.
The human nature assumed by the Word is like a garment worn by a man. The garment is changed, conformed to the figure of the man; nevertheless, the man himself undergoes no change. Analogously, the human nature is changed, conformed substantially (not accidentally, as in the case of the garment-and, as we shall see, in the case of sanctifying grace) to the Person of the Word. This mutatio, passio, and, as St. Thomas adds, this tractio of the human nature to the divine Person is something real in the human nature. It is created actuation by uncreated act.
To repeat, we have an instance of an act (the Person of the Word alone) which actuates, yet does not inform, because of the imperfection involved in information (act-dependence and act-limitation). Hie actuation alone is received by way of information. The point to be stressed in all this is that the Word, precisely as distinct from Father and Holy Spirit, does communicate something intrinsically to the humanity, namely, a created participation in the divine being as this being is properly possessed by the Word. The Word alone gives the humanity its actuation, considering, of course, this actuation under its formal aspect, as flowing from the Word into the humanity by quasi-formal causality. Otherwise, there would be no true ratio sußciens for the humanity's being referred to, and united with, the Person of the Word alone.
Furthermore, since an essentially intrinsic note, such as existence, is not received at all unless it be received intrinsically, it follows that, unless the Word alone gives or communicates His own divine being to His humanity, and that intrinsically, He does not communicate being at all.
32 Seemingly, then, one must hold that the Second Person, in His distinction from Father and Holy Spirit, does communicate a reality intrinsically to the humanity which He assumes. Since this communication cannot be the result of merely efficient causality, it must be the result of some kind of formal causality, namely, quasiformal causality, or created actuation by uncreated act. And precisely because this communication of divine being, this mutatio, passio, and tractio of the humanity to the Person of the Word comes from the Word alone, for this reason it is that the humanity is referred, drawn to the Word alone and with the Word alone is so intimately united in a true substantial union.
A SUPPOSITION Let us suppose that we have a case of three human natures which are hypostatically united with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. 33 Each of these human natures will have within it a created actuation, a passio, mutatio, by which it is elevated to a level proportionate to the union. This will be a passive communication of divine being precisely as this divine being is proper to the divine Person with whom the particular humanity is hypostatically united. At the same time, this created actuation will be the union between the humanity and the divine Person; that is to say, it will be the union taken passively in its very foundation, which gives rise to the relation to a particular divine Person. Here we have the crucial point of the problem we are discussing: is this created actuation, this mutatio, this passio, and passive communication of divine being exactly and under every respect the same for each of the three humanities which is assumed unto a personal hypostatic union with a particular and distinct divine Person?
We hold that these created actuations must in some way be distinct and differ from one another. For, if these passive communications or receptions of divine being are the same in each of the assumed humanities (and that under every possible aspect), how may one explain how/why humanity A will be united with and referred to the Father alone? And again, how explain the same with regard to humanity Β and C, namely, that they will be united with and referred respectively to the Word and Holy Spirit alone? If the created actu ation in each humanity is, under every respect, the same, then there is utterly lacking a truly sufficient reason for each humanity's being united with, and referred to, the Person with whom alone it is united.
We hold the following to be the reason why each humanity is referred to and united with a different and distinct Person, and to and with Him alone: namely, the created actuation in each humanity is not only the result of efficient causality on the part of the entire Blessed Trinity acting as the one indistinct Principle of the created effect; but this actuation, or passive communication of divine being, is also tota quanta the result of a formal communication of divine being as this being is proper to the Word (or as the case may be, to Father and to Holy Spirit) and proper to Him (or to Them) alone.
In other words, each divine Person communicates the same divine being, but in a relatively different manner, in accordance with His own personal and hypostatic character and relative difference from the other two divine Persons. Under this precise aspect, the com munication of divine being is not merely an opus ad extra (a work of purely efficient causality and hence absolutely and under every respect common to all three divine Persons, sine ulla Personarum distinctions) ; but, in the very communication of divine being by quasi-formal causality, or by this created actuation by uncreated act, this com munication is also a tractio, & drawing of the creature into the inner circuit of proper divine trinitarian life. Hence, with E. Mersch, 34 one may perhaps say that, under this precise aspect, the uniting of 34 Cf. "Filii in Filio, " Novo. rev. thiol, LXV (1938) , 826 f. the creature with the divine Person (or Persons) is not strictly an opus ad extra, but rather ad intra.
Were the created actuation in each of the three assumed humanities exactly and under every respect identical, seemingly, then, the only sufficient reason why in a particular humanity the created actuation would refer this same humanity to a particular and distinct divine Person with whom it is united, and to Him alone, would be the divine will. Such a theory (i.e., which would maintain that each created actuation is in every respect identical for the three assumed humanities) would logically result in a pure extrinsécistne. Were the three actuations in every respect identical, none of the humanities (which are referred to and united with a particular divine Person) would receive anything within themselves which would be a created, substantial participation of the divine being proper to the Person to whom alone (precisely in virtue of the supposed hypostatic union) the particular humanities are related and with whom alone they are hypostatically united. Therefore, the only reason why any particular humanity would be united with a definite Person would be some purely extrinsic reason.
The reasoning leading us to hold that the three actuations would be in some way different is the following: (1) According to our supposition, each humanity would be united with a particular divine Person; (2) the union would be substantial, consisting in a sharing by the humanity in the being of the divine Person with whom it is united; (3) hence, to be united with a particular divine Person, in His distinction from the other Persons, the humanity must receive from Him a passive communication of divine being as this being is proper to this particular Person (and which is, therefore, in some way different from the passive communication of divine being which the other two humanities receive from the two divine Persons with whom they are united). For union means, surely, an intercommunication of that being which is proper to the subjects united.
Each communication of divine being is to be considered as qualified, determined, and colored (if one may thus speak) by the proper hypostatic character of the particular and distinct divine Person who actively communicates this divine being. In brief, we hold that the reality (a created, finite, and passive communication of divine being) which each of the three humanities receives would be, from the absolute point of view, exactly the same for each humanity. Nevertheless, from the relative side and when this communication of divine being is considered as an essentially unitive substantial modification of the ' humanity, there is a real difference in each of the three communications of divine being. For the one simple reality communicated is, in each supposed hypostatic union, conferred upon each humanity in a relatively different manner determined by the relative distinction and hypostatic character of each divine Person. Because of its particular and special origin, each actuation, or passive communication of divine being, is essentially a unitive entity. However, it is not essentially unitive, in the sense that it unites the humanity receiving this substantial modification with any divine Person without distinction. Nevertheless, the actuation must be said to be unitive in that it is essentially destined to effect a substantial union between the humanity and that particular divine Person from which the communication flows by quasi-formal causality. And because the communication of divine being is in each case determined by the particular hypostatic character of the divine Person who confers it upon His humanity, this clearly provides a foundation for a relation that terminates at one divine Person and at Him alone.
ANOTHER SUPPOSITION
Let us now imagine that all three divine Persons are hypostatically united with the very one and same human nature. 35 The question arises: is the passive communication of divine being which each divine Person confers upon the common humanity in every way identical with that communicated by the other two divine Persons? And again, why is it that this particular humanity would be referred to, and united with, all three divine Persons, whereas in the hypostatic union there is only one divine Person, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, who enters into union with His sacred humanity?
In this supposed case of three divine Persons united hypostatically with a single humanity we suggest the following. The created actuation is one physical, simple, undivided, utterly supernatural entity 36 Sum. Theol, III, q. 3, q. 6. in the substantial order. It is not an ens quod, but an ens quo, substantially modifying the humanity and immediately uniting it with the three divine Persons. It is the union itself (taken passively). It is communicated by all three Persons by quasi-formal causality, or by actuating, yet without informing, the humanity. Nevertheless, although this substantial actuation of the one and same humanity comes from all three divine Persons, each Person communicates a substantial participation in divine being precisely as He possesses it, namely, in a manner which is relatively, yet most really, different (in accordance with the difference of each Person's personal and proper hypostatic character) from the manner in which the other two divine Persons communicate this substantial actuation, or created and finite passive participation in trinitarian being.
Hence, this substantial created actuation of the one humanity would be the formal result of a formal communication of divine being from three distinct Persons conferring this one divine being in three relatively distinct and different manners according to the proper hypostatic character of each divine Person. Accordingly, as a result, there would spring up from this one created actuation, as from a single reality, three distinct relations to three distinct Persons. This created reality in the assumed humanity is both one and threefold: it is absolutely one, considered as a substantial mutation of the humanity; it is relatively threefold, if considered as a passio (and an essentially unitive substantial modification) brought into being in a threefold relatively different manner through each Person's impressing upon, i.e., communicating to, the humanity the divine being as each divine Person possesses this being in a proper manner determined by His hypostatic character.
By the three distinct relations which spring forth, as it were, or well up, from this one created actuation, the humanity is referred to the three distinct divine Persons, with each of whom the humanity is substantially united in hypostatic union. And all this, because the created actuation is in its entirety the formal result of the formal communication of divine being by each divine Person according to His relative distinction from the other two Persons.
To repeat: the reality communicated to the humanity, i.e., the substantial created actuation, is one and simple as a substantial modification of the humanity. Yet, at the same time, this created actuation is stamped with a threefold relativity. For it has been communicated in its entirety by each divine Person in a relatively different manner determined by each Person's relative distinction and proper hypostatic character. Hence, from the one created actuation, as from a miniature divine essence (to use faltering human language), there springs forth a miniature trinity, so to speak, of three distinct relations to three distinct divine Persons. And the human nature assumed belongs to all three distinct Persons, so that one could say in all truth: this Man is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
There is no pantheism involved here, no removal of the creature from its creaturely sphere. For the created actuation is just that, namely, created and finite. This created actuation is received into a created, finite humanity; and, as such, it is limited to the created sphere in which revolves the being of every creature. Nevertheless, as Scheeben has indicated often, 36 this created actuation, this mutatio and passio, this passive communication of divine being, and this passive union has its roots, not in the creature, but in God Himself, and not in Deus unus, but in Deus trinus qua trinus.
APPLICATION TO THE INHABITATION
Most theologians, as we have seen, hold that the mode of the inhabitation is perfectly and in every way identical for each divine Person. The new presence and the hypostatic characters of the divine Persons, so we are told, must be kept rigorously apart as two things quite distinct from one another. And, above all, the firmly established principle, "omnia opera ad extra sunt communia to ti Trinitati," and the pauvreté of the divine Persons demand that the inhabitation be explained according to the laws of pure appropriation.
In the first place, it seems tenable that the dictum, "omnia opera ad extra, etc.," is valid only with regard to works of efficient causality. For only in divine efficiency can one show that the inner trinitarian relations do not enter. But, if in the effect the creature enter into relation with a divine Person as such, as is surely the case in the hypostatic union, then we have an instance where an opus ad extra is not referred indeterminately to the entire Trinity. True it is that, under the aspect of a new created entity, the grace of union is to be referred to the entire Trinity as to its one efficient cause. But, if one considers this same grace of union as a passive reception of the divine being into the humanity, and precisely as this same divine being is properly possessed by the Word in a personal manner according to His particular hypostatic character, then, under this formal aspect, the grace of union is an opus ad extra which is not referable indeterminately to the entire Trinity. For, under this aspect, the humanity is to be referred to the Word alone, since, thus considered, the grace of union is the very union itself (taken passively) of the humanity with the Person of the Word and with Him alone.
More and more today theologians are realizing that created grace results from the inhabitation, and not vice versa. St. Thomas himself says: ". . . . ipsae personae divinae quadam sui sigillatione in animabus nostris relinquunt quaedam dona. . . ."
37 Namely, the conferring of created grace takes place by the impression on the soul of the divine seal of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Thus created grace becomes, so to speak, the concave impression of the convex divine seal. Hence, the just soul, in the words of St. Thomas, possesses God "per quemdam modum passionis."
38
Going back over one of our suppositions, we may say again that, if three divine Persons, instead of the Second Person alone, were to assume a humanity unto Themselves, this same humanity would be united with, and referred to, all three distinct Persons. The foundation of the union would be one, simple, and undivided created actuation, one communication of divine being in the substantial order. And this would be a communication of divine being precisely as this being is proper to each divine Person. Hence, each Person would communicate the divine being in a manner that would be determined by His own proper hypostatic character and difference from the other two Persons. As a result, from this substantial actuation of the humanity and grace of substantial union, there would well up and spring forth three distinct relations, one to each distinct divine Person. Such would be the case, because the actuation is received tota quanta and "per quemdam modum passionis substantialis" from each divine Person who, through an exercise of quasi-formal causality, would communicate the divine being to the humanity assumed. And, since wherever there is passio there also is found a relation springing up to the one causing this passio, we have here, consequently, three distinct relations, one to each divine Person who is suo modo the selfsufficient and complete quasi-formal cause of this substantially deified humanity.
In the inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity and in the union with the divine Persons through created grace we have a condition which, though quite different from, is nevertheless analogous to, the supposed case of a single humanity's being assumed to substantial union with all three divine Persons. In the first place, as all will agree, in the inhabitation through grace there is much more than a merely external juxtaposition of the divine Persons and the human soul. The union is not a merely moral union, i.e., one based only on external relationships or upon a special activity of God in the soul. No, here there is a real entering of the divine Persons into, and a real ontological union of these same Persons with, the grace-filled soul. This presence of the divine Persons in the just soul is entirely new in kind, nome speciei, from the ordinary substantial presence of God in all creatures. Yet the divine Persons cannot be within the soul by way of information; nevertheless, in the soul They definitely are. And, if They are in the soul, the soul surely receives Them intrinsically within its very bosom. But this can only be creato modo, according to the finite capacity of the soul. In other words, the soul will receive the divine Persons, in that They actuate the soul without informing it. The soul receives the Blessed Trinity as the divine threefold act which actuates the soul without informing it. Keeping well in mind, therefore, what we have said in the above paragraphs about created actuation, we offer the following suggestions, which perhaps may cast additional light upon the problem of the "how" in the inhabitation of the divine Persons in the just soul.
In the grace-state, since we have to do with an already existing human person, there will be only an accidental communication of divine trinitarian life, a communication of the divine nature and being as it is properly possessed by each of the three divine Persons. Each divine Person will communicate "quadam sui sigillatione" an accidental share of the divine being and nature to the human soul. Through its obediential potency the soul is laid open to the divine threefold act which will actuate the soul without informing it. And thus, via the potency, there will flow into the soul "per quemdam modum passionis," a stream of that divine being which, though utterly one and undivided, is nonetheless distinguished, so to speak, by the threefold relative channels through which it courses lovingly, a surging flood of divine life, the life of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, pulsating, as it were, in infinite urge for gracious self-communication.
Therefore, since each Person communicates tota quanta this finite sharing in trinitarian life, there will be in the soul a passive communication of this life, a created actuation, a passio corresponding to the active communication of the particular divine Person. This passio will relate the soul to and unite it with a particular divine Person, not because this definite Person communicates to the soul an absolute reality which is not conferred upon the soul equally by the other two divine Persons. But this passio will truly unite the soul with, and refer it to, a distinct Person because each Person communicates the one reality in a relatively different manner. This relatively different manner of communicating the very same created participation in trinitarian life suffices for saying that the soul is united with, and related to, the divine Persons in their mutual distinctions.
Under this aspect, created grace, as an accidental communication of divine life and being (communicated by each divine Person modo relative diverso), appears as a current, or flame, or light-flood of divine being, flowing from the one Godhead, but distinguished relatively by its passage through the three divine and distinct Persons. The reality communicated by each Person is, absolutely speaking, the same: the one, indivisible, finite, accidental, created communication of their common divine trinitarian life. Nevertheless, each Person communicates this one reality wholly and entirely, and that as a Person distinct from the other two divine Persons.
Created grace, therefore, may be considered as the passive reception, in an accidental, finite, and created manner, of proper trinitarian life. Its roots are not in the human soul, but rather in the divine nature itself, yet in this divine nature as properly possessed by the / three distinct Persons, each of whom communicates the divine life in a relatively different manner determined by His proper hypostatic character. And just as the three divine Persons have the same divine life and nature through identity with their very Persons, so analogously and finito et creato modo the human soul will have by accidental and finite participation the same divine life, and this divine life precisely as it is communicated in a relative different and proper manner by each distinct Person.
Moreover, just as the three divine Persons can be three only because each Person is this one Being, and just as the relations by which these three divine Persons are distinguished well up and spring forth, so to speak, with natural necessity from the una quaedam summa res which is both One and Three, so, analogously, from the one and indivisible, created and finite communication of divine life to the soul will there arise three relations, one to each divine Person who, by quasi-formal causality, communicates the divine life to the soul.
Created grace thus takes on the aspect of a finite, miniature, and (if such language be not too venturesome) facsimile-imitated trinity. Father and Son will breathe forth the Holy Spirit into the soul. And the same Holy Spirit, "per quemdam modum passionisi which results from "quadam sigillatione sui" in the just soul, will be received therein finito modo, as the created nature of the soul demands. But, it is not the Holy Spirit alone that the soul receives. The Father Himself will give to the soul His only begotten Son and a true share in the divine life and being precisely as possessed by His Son, a real share in that filiation of His only Son, of that filiation upon which our own adoptive filiation is modelled. Finally, the Father Himself, as principle and source of all intra-and extra-trinitarian life and being, will come to the soul and give Himself to it, in St. Thomas' words, as the "ultimum principium ad quod recurrimus."
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Hence created grace will be the passive reception of the divine Persons within the soul. Moreover, it will be the union itself (taken passively) with the same divine Persons. And finally, it will be the inhabitation itself (in the passive, created, and finite sense) of these very same Persons within the just soul. For the only way in which these divine Persons can be received within the soul is in a created manner, according to the finite capacity of the soul itself. Truly, in this light, created grace will be a rich sharing in God's own nature, not in the nature precisely of the God of creation and conservation, of Deus unuSy but rather in the intimate trinitarian life of the triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, whom Jesus Christ has revealed to men.
CONCLUSION
In this theory there is no question of an exclusively proper union with the Holy Spirit. At the most, there is merely question of the order of the Persons in the indwelling. As Scheeben so boldly yet reverently explains, the union between the soul and the divine Persons is like unto a matrimonium ratum et consummatum between two human persons. In the supernatural union with the divine Persons, there will be an insertion of the semen spirituale divinum into the human soul. The Holy Spirit stands forth as the "first" to enter into the temple; but He only enters therein because Father and Son breathe Him forth into the soul as their semen spirituale divinum. They, too, are united immediately with the human soul, though the union be in and through the Holy Spirit. Just as the Holy Spirit is immediately "united" with the divine essence (through identity with His Person), even though the Holy Spirit receives the divine essence through His procession from Father and Son, so, in analogous fashion the soul is immediately united with Father and Son, even though this union takes place through and in the Holy Spirit whom Father and Son breathe forth into the soul.
Summing up, therefore, we say that grace is one, simple, created, accidental absolute reality, if taken as a mere modification of the human soul. However, taken as a bond of union (and, in very fact, as the union itself, considered passively), created grace is essentially relative in a threefold way. For, under this aspect, it is but the passive communication in a threefold relatively different manner of divine trinitarian life as properly possessed by each Person. From this one reality of grace (which each Person communicates in its fulness) there spring up three relations terminating at each divine Person with whom the soul is intimately and immediately united, though it be true that the order of the union observes the inverted order of the divine processions. All this, to be sure, is in the accidental order. Viewed thus, created grace will be the passive union of the soul with the divine Persons. And again, created grace will be the inhabitation of the three divine Persons, taking inhabitation in the passive sense, as that which is received (by way of information) into the soul. This can only be the created actuation itself, hence, created grace.
In this rough sketch of the "how" of the non-exclusively proprium theory of the inhabitation we believe that a better understanding of the relation of created and uncreated grace may perhaps be found. Furthermore, in our opinion, this explanation better safeguards the absolutely supernatural character of created grace, rooting it inextricably in the very nature of God Himself. Also, in the light of this explanation, certain assertions of St. Thomas become, we believe, more intelligible.
We shall indicate but a few statements of St. Thomas which concern this subject. Among several which might be cited, there is one statement which, seemingly, is contrary to our explanation. St. Thomas says clearly that it is una fruitione that we enjoy the divine Persons; 40 for, surely, Their divine life is but one life, Their goodness but one bonitas divina. It should be carefully noted that, in our explanation, although the soul does indeed have distinct relations to each divine Person, nevertheless the reality which each Person communicates to the soul is but one sole reality, one bonitas divina participata. However, we hold that each Person bestows this one divine goodness in a relatively different manner (conditioned by His hypostatic difference and relative distinction). The reality conferred is one created grace, hence una fruitio, although communicated to the soul in a threefold relatively different manner by each Person.
St. Thomas' contention, that created grace takes its origin from, and is modelled after, the divine relations themselves, 41 is, we believe, more easily understood in the light of our explanation. The same holds true with regard to his affirming that the missions of the Son and Holy Spirit are distinct both according to their eternal processions and according to the effect in the creature, and this secundum rem. 42 Again, his numerous references to the Holy Spirit's being the nexus 40 Ibid., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, sol.
* Ibid., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, sol. « Ibid., a. 2, sol. conjoining the soul and God become more intelligible when viewed in the light of the solution we have proposed.
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At the risk of straying from the proper subject of this paper, we should like to draw attention to an important passage concerning the role of the Holy Spirit. In commenting on the words of Our Lord at the Last Supper, "ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus" (John 17:22), St. Thomas teaches the following. 44 The Father and Son, we are told, 45 can be considered insofar as they are one in essence, or insofar as they are distinct Persons. Under the first consideration, the unity of Father and Son will be founded in their community of essence. As distinct Persons, however, they will be united through a unity of love and harmony ("per consonantiam amoris") had through the Holy Spirit.
There is not here (in the passage from St. John), St. Thomas holds, question of essential unity only, because we are not united to God in that way ("quia ilio modo Deo non unimur"), but there is rather question of unity of love, which is the Holy Spirit. In other words, our union with God through created grace is not with the divine Persons precisely as They are one in essence, but rather as They are one in the love and harmony of the Holy Spirit. Only according to the unity of essence does the distinction of Persons disappear; for the divine essence is the one and only common element which the divine Persons have. But, in that They are one through unity of love and harmony in the Holy Spirit, They are united among Themselves as distinct Persons. And, St. Thomas teaches, that is the way in which we are united with Them, namely, as distinct Persons. We believe that insistence on some kind of distinction (namely, a relative distinction, as explained above) in the union (taken passively), insofar as this union is a reality in the soul, renders more understandable a union with distinct Persons.
Finally, in our explanation, we also can speak of appropriation regarding the role of the Holy Spirit. However, this use of appropriation will be quite different from that employed when, for example, we appropriate the act of creation to the Father. For in creation there is involved no distinction of Persons whatsoever. On the contrary, this is, we believe, not true in the process of sanctification. Furthermore, we too can say that the inhabitation is common to all three divine Persons, since all three Persons dwell within the soul and since each Person is the true quasi-formal cause of the entire reality of created grace. And, since the conferring of Themselves upon the soul is indeed a work of love, this may be "appropriated" to the Spirit of divine love. Nevertheless, this kind of appropriation will always involve and presuppose a true proprium. Our explanation, as suggested in the above paragraphs, is purely tentative and has been proposed in the hope that it may perhaps provoke further thought upon this most engaging subject of the inhabitation. Perhaps, in the future, it may be possible to consider in detail St. Thomas' own teaching on the relation between created and uncreated grace, and at the same time discuss more fully the objections raised against the non-exclusively proprium theory of the inhabitation of the Most Blessed Trinity in the souls of just men.
